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SHORT FORM MERGER
defendant wishes to testify falsely -and to enlist the aid of his attorney
in so doing. In answer to Freedman, one commentator has aptly said:
[T]he very existence of the special rights accorded a defendant
whose liberties are at stake-appointed counsel, the fifth amend-
ment privilege, jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
others-militates against adding the right to compel counsel to
allow the client to perjure himself and even ethically require the
counsel to argue the client's false story to the jury.91
Although he owes his client the duty of zealous representation, the
lawyer's own values, his honesty and his integrity, are also at stake.
These values should not be sacrificed to the client who, by choosing to
pursue an illegal course of conduct, brings on his own prejudice.
If Freedman's solution elevates the duty of confidentiality to the
client at too great an expense to the lawyer, then a compromise such as
the trial court's, however flawed, that attempts to preserve the law-
yer's duty both to his client and to the court, is necessary. Unless the
holding in Robinson is somehow limited to the particular facts of the
case or overruled, the court would seem to have foreclosed the possibility
of such a compromise solution for the North Carolina attorney.
DEBORAI A. BRIAN
Securities Regulation-Challenging the Short Form Merger
Through Rule 10b-5 and the Corporate Purpose Doctrine
In the wake of the depressed securities markets of the 1970's, a
corporate phenomenon known as "going private" has become increas-
ingly prevalent.' "Going private" usually entails the buying out of pub-
lic minority shareholders of a corporation by a few majority share-
holders so as to take the corporation outside the scope of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and its attendant reporting requirements.2 The
danger inherent in this'mechanism, and one of the reasons it has drawn
increasingly close judicial scrutiny, is that in many cases it allows a few
91. Rotunda, supra note 86, at 627.
1. See Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 987 (1974).
2. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE LJ. 903, 904 (1975).
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shareholders who took the corporation public during the stock boom
of the 1960's to force minority shareholders to sell their shares at a frac-
tion of the original purchase price.'
A number of devices serve as vehicles for "going private," one of
the most utilized of which is the short form merger.4 However, a re-
cent series of cases originating in New York5 has caused a re-evaluation
of the elements essential to a valid short form merger. In Green v.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals accep-
ted an expansive reading of rule lOb-5 7 and invalidated a short form
merger that complied in every respect with state law on the ground that
the majority shareholders did not come forward with any "justifiable
corporate purpose" for the merger other than the elimination of the
public minority shareholders. But a later New York Supreme Court
case, Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc.,8 in interpreting fiduciary obligations of majority
shareholders in a short form merger appeared to eviscerate the corpo-
rate purpose standard enunciated in Green by expressing receptivity to
any stated corporate purpose. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
then applied the same broad corporate purpose analysis when the same
merger came before it on charges of rule lOb-5 violations in Merrit v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby.' This note will suggest that a limited applica-
tion of the "corporate purpose doctrine," as applied through rule lOb-
5, would keep use of rule 10b-5 outside the regulation of fiduciary ob-
ligations to shareholders, 10 traditionally the prerogative of state law,
and would limit its operation to situations that more directly involve
3. See id. at 905.
4. The short form merger statute, which exists in approximately 38 states, allows
a parent corporation that owns some percentage of the stock in a subsidiary, usually
90%, to merge the two corporations afid buy out the public minority shares in the sub-
sidiary. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). For a list of the states that
now have short form merger statutes, see Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d
1283, 1299 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
5. Men-it v. Libby, MeNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976); Green
v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976)
(No. 75-1753); Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
6. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
8. - Misc. 2d -, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976). It should be
noted that the New York Supreme Court was limited to state fiduciary law since it
did not have available the federal remedies under rule lob-5.
9. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
,10. Green ,v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304 (2d Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753)."
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securities fraud, rather than venturing into the vast domain of corporate
mismanagement.
The short form merger statute's fundamental objective is to allow
a merger to be effectuated without the supposedly needless costs of
proxy solicitations and shareholder meetings when the majority share-
holders are in accord and when the minority would be powerless to
block a merger anyway. 1 A dissenting minority, under most short
form merger statutes, must resort to an appraisal proceeding as its ex-
clusive remedy. 2 It may be argued that the exclusivity of an appraisal
remedy is the only realistic approach in modem times, especially in the
face of possibly obdurate and unreasonable minorities. The fallacy in
this reasoning is that the majority (in many cases the same persons who
took the corporation public initially) is given the power to choose when
that appraisal will occur. Therefore, when the price of the corpora-
tion's stock is at its nadir, the majority shareholders can decide to effect
a short form merger, thereby forcing a buy-out of the minority at a rel-
atively low price.13 Although other criticisms have also been launched
at the short form merger statutes,' 4 the short form merger does provide
a functional tool, when used fairly, to effectuate the will of the majority
in the least expensive and quickest manner possible.
It was in the context of a short form merger that the Second Cir-
cuit decided Green v. Sante Fe Industries, Inc., 5 a case that appeared
to have such far-reaching and devastating effects that Judge Moore, in
dissent, described it as nullifying "not only the corporate laws of Dela-
11. See Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, 24 Sw. L.J. 91 (1970). But
see Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 596 (1965):
The short merger has endured, and shows signs of flourishing, because it
offers the opportunity of merger without the needless expense of holding
meetings whose outcomes would be pre-determined. Such savings will be
significant, however, only where the corporation is of substantial size -and
where the question would have to be presented at a special meeting.
Id. at 602.
12. The exclusivity of the dissenting shareholders' remedy has been the subject
of much debate. For arguments in favor of exclusivity, see Vorenberg, Exclusiveness
of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964). Many
of the short form merger statutes are ambiguous on their face about the dissenting
shareholders' remedy, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 17-6712 (1974); some specify that they are
exclusive, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(B) (Purdon Supp. 1974); and at least
one provides that appraisal is not the exclusive remedy, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b)
(1975). For a discussion of exclusivity, see Borden, supra note 1, at 1023.
13. E.g., Marshel v. A-W Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. These criticisms *include such topics as tax problems created for minority
shareholders whose shares are forcibly purchased. For an excellent discussion of the
criticisms, see Comment, supra note 11.
15. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
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ware with respect to short-form corporate mergers, but also, in effect,
comparable laws in an additional thirty-seven states.""' The facts can
be simply stated. In 1974 Santa Fe Natural Resources (Resources)
owned approximately ninety-five percent of the capital stock of Kirby
Lumber Company. Resources "embarked upon a plan to effect a short-
form merger pursuant to Section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law
. . ,,17 In furtherance of this plan Forest Products, Inc. was organ-
ized. Resources transferred its ninety-five percent interest in Kirby to
Forest Products in exchange for all of Forest Products' stock. The
bdard of Forest Products then adopted a resolution under which it would
merge with Kirby, with Kirby becoming the surviving corporation. The
merger became effective July 31, 1974. Plaintiffs, minority share-
holders in Kirby, sued to enjoin the merger as a "manipulative and de-
ceptive device in breach of Rule lOb-5. '11 8  The court of appeals re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.'"
The first major obstacle hurdled by the court of appeals was the
historically limited application of rule lOb-5 to only those transactions
in which there had been misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.20 The
court accomplished this task simply by utilizing sections (a) and (c) of
the rule, sections that had virtually been read out of the statute by courts
requiring misrepresentation or nondisclosure.2" These sections pro-
hibit "(a) . . . any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . .and
(c)... any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person .. ,"22 Fraud, as used
in these sections, is equated by the court -in Green with a breach of
fiduciary duty by the majority against the minority shareholders.28
Popkin v. Bishop,24 an earlier Second Circuit case in which the com-
plaint of the minority shareholders was dismissed because there was
no showing of nondisclosure or misrepresentation, was distinguished on
two grounds: (1) in Popkin a strong corporate purpose was shown,25
16. Id. at 1299 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 1288.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1294.
20. The cases are not entirely clear, but on their face appear to limit the appli-
cation of rule lOb-5 to non-disclosure situations. E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1972); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afj'd
per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. 533 F.2d at 1287.
22. 17 C.F.R. -§ 240.10b-5 (1976).
23. 531 F.2d at 1287.
24. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
25. 533 F.2d at 1291.
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and (2) approval of the minority shareholders was sought and given.26
The first distinction appears valid, although it should be noted that de-
fendants in Green were not required by state law to demonstrate a valid
corporate purpose and therefore had no reason to provide one. The
second distinction is almost totally without merit, especially in light of
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,7 in which the Second Circuit held, just
prior to its decision in Green, that a long form merger under New
York law violated rule lOb-5, even though it had been submitted for
shareholder approval. 8  Also, submission for shareholder approval
would almost assuredly be a meaningless formality since in all cases
involving short form mergers, the majority already controls at least
ninety percent of the stock, thereby assuring passage of any motion for
merger.
29
The finding of fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty, by the court in
Green focused on five major factors: (1) defendants had shown no
"justifiable corporate purpose"; (2) no prior notice of the merger was
given to minority shareholders; (3) the minority shareholders had no
opportunity to obtain injunctive relief; (4) the proposed price to
be paid for the minority shares was excessively low; and (5) the
shares of the minority were being purchased with corporate funds.8"
The first three factors were not required by state law and therefore
defendants were not on notice that they needed to comply with any
of these; the lack of justifiable corporate purpose, discussed below,3' was
heavily relied upon by the court nonetheless. The minority share-
holders have a remedy for the fourth factor, excessively low purchase
price, through the appraisal proceeding provided by state law. 2 The
fifth factor also does not withstand close scrutiny; from the standpoint
of the majority shareholders it would seem to make little difference, in an
economic sense, whether the shares were purchased with corporate
funds or with private shareholders' money. If the money is taken direct-
ly from corporate funds, the corporation will simply have less money once
the merger is effected and the majority shareholders become the sole
26. Id.
27. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 1282. For discussion-see Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead
or Alive?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 2, 14, col. 1.
29. Brodsky, supra note 28, at 14, col. 1.
30. 533 F.2d at 1290, 1292-93.
31. The doctrine is utilized extensively by the court. For a discussion, see text
accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
32. See Brodsky, supra note 28.
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owners; realistically the money ultimately comes from the majority's
pockets in either event.
3 3
The predominant issue that prevailed in the aftermath of Green
centered around the theory of "justifiable corporate purpose. '34 The
theory appears to have its roots in the idea that "a scheme conceived
solely for the benefit of controlling stockholders without regard to the
welfare of the corporation or of the minority constitutes a breach of
the fiduciary obligation"; 35 thus, "the requirement that there be a show-
ing of legitimate corporate purpose."36 Obviously the doctrine was im-
plemented to provide for-an analysis of the motives behind the "going
private" transaction. 7 It has been praised by some as providing "an
equitable method of protecting the minority shareholder while at the same
time giving deference to the freedom of the corporation to go private for
valid business reasons. '38 But it can also be condemned as an imprecise
and vague standard with which those effecting important corporate
mergers must attempt to comply.
Commissioner Sommer of the SEC, who has argued for a strict
interpretation of the "justifiable business purpose" standard, has ex-
pressed the view that a corporation going public "makes a commitment
that, absent the most compelling business justification, management and
those in control will do nothing to interfere with the liquidity of the pub-
lic investment or the protection afforded the public by the federal se-
curities laws." 39  But another leading authority, Professor Vorenberg,
believes very little or no corporate purpose should be necessary in the
context of a short form merger."
Amid this controversy, the question still remained of how the Sec-
ond Circuit would interpret its own standard. Finally, in Merrit v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby,41 the federal court got its chance on a com-
plaint of securities fraud, but only after the minority shareholders had
33. See id.
34. See Brodsky, Going Private-Is It Over?, N.Y.L.J., March 3, 1976, at 1, col.
1, 2, col 1.
35. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal.Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d - -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
36. Id.
37. See Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRD-
HAM L. REV. 796, 806 (1976).
38. Id. at 816.
39. A. Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, reprinted
in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,698.
40. See Vorenberg, supra note 12, at 1192-93.
41. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
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been unsuccessful in an attempt to block the same merger in the New
York state courts.42 Nestle Alimentana (Nestle), a Swiss company,
had effected a short form merger between Universal Food Specialties
(UFS), a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle, and Libby, McNeill &
Libby (Libby), a Maine corporation. After purchasing Libby stock
for some fifteen years, Nestle and affiliates owned approximately sixty-
one percent by May 1975. UFS, which controlled the Libby shares
for Nestle, announced a cash tender offer for the remaining. Libby
shares at $8.125 per share, substantially higher than the prevailing mar-
ket price. In this offer, UFS stated its intention to merge with Nestle
if the former acquired at least ninety percent of the Libby stock. Just
prior to the expiration of the tender offer the minority shareholders of
Libby brought an abortive suit for monetary damages. Seven months
later they sought injunctive relief.4"
The New York Supreme Court in Tanzer was the first court to
confront the merger on a motion for preliminary injunction by the mi-
nority shareholders. 44  The Tanzer court's scope of inquiry was limited
to possible breaches of fiduciary obligations because the federal reme-
dies afforded by rule lOb-5 were unavailable.45 The court first distin-
guished Green on the ground that since that decision had been on a
motion to dismiss, the federal court was forced to assume the veracity
of the allegation of no valid corporate purpose, wThereas Tanzer invol-
ved an application for a preliminary injunction.46 Two additional fac-
tors that the supreme court relied upon to distinguish Green were that in
the present case (1) there was no under-valuation of the minority
shares, 47 and (2) the minority shareholders had been given notice of
the proposed Libby merger.4 8
42. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
43. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75.
44. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478. It should also be noted that another New
York state case, Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., - Misc. 2d -, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), which involvd a very similar issue, was decided just prior to the Tanzer
decision. In Schulwolf, business reasons were advanced for the merger and the minority
shareholders were not actually being frozen out, since they would receive preferred
stock in the resultant corporation; but the minority shareholders did not receive the
"residual equity" benefits to which common shareholders are normally entitled. Also,
Schulwolf involved a long form merger, which could have been voted down by the
public shareholders. Based on these factors, the court denied an injunction against
the merger.
45. - Misc. 2d at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
46. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
47. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
48. Id.
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The court then relied upon nine stated business purposes for the
merger to assuage its suspicions of fraud. These purposes can be gen-
erally grouped into two categories: (1) the merger of the two corpo-
rations would result in more efficiently operated businesses for both
while also solving possible problems of conflicts of interest; and (2)
the merger would result in savings on the cost of complying with the
securities laws.4 9  As one noted author has pointed out, the first group
of purposes could be accomplished without the elimination of the minor-
ity interest since they rely only upon the combination of the two cor-
porations.50 The second group of purposes, while depending upon the
elimination of the public minority interest, has not generally been ac-
cepted as a justifiable business purpose in and of itself.5 1  Despite
these criticisms of the stated purposes, it can at least be argued that
the corporate purpose doctrine is not so much concerned with justifi-
cations for elimination of the minority as with preventing a "naked grab
for power" 52 by placing some burden on the majority to justify their ac-
tions.
After failing to obtain, any relief in the state court, the minority
shareholders brought an action for preliminary injunction in federal dis-
trict court. Upon denial of the injunction, the case came before the
Second Circuit on appeal.58  The court of appeals distinguished
Green 4 in much the same manner as had the New York Supreme
Court.5 5 But the court had somewhat more difficulty coping with
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.5 6 Since that case was in the same pro-
cedural posture as Libby, the court had to distinguish it factually: in
contrast to Libby, Marshel involved a situation in which the same peo-
ple who had taken the corporation public during the bull market of the
1960's were attempting to utilize the state short form merger statute
to eliminate the minority at a low cost. This acquisition was being ac-
complished through the vehicle of a shell corporation and with the use
of corporate funds1 7
49. Brodsky, Going Private (III), N.Y.L.., April 7, 1976, at 1, col. 1, 2, col. 3.
50. Id. at 2, col. 3.
51. Id.
52. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
53. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1313 (2d Cir. 1976).
54. Id. at 1312.
55. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
56. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1312 (2d Cir. 1976).
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The court relied upon a confidential report to the board of Nestle
by its president as a valid indication of the corporate purposes for the
merger. 8 Two of the purposes vere listed as follows:
(1) 70% of Libby's sales were in the United States, Canada and
Puerto Rico, and it had contacts with farmers which would be use-
ful in integrated selling to the underdeveloped countries. (2)
Libby had a healthy balance sheet and a cash flow slightly higher
than its future investment possibilities, and its stock was valued at
only a third of book value.59
Obviously these purposes are subject to the same criticisms as those dis-
cussed earlier in relation to the Tanzer decision."0 But the president's
memorandum to the board also spoke of the advantages to be gained
"'in the very fact of eliminating the minority stockholders.' "61 The
court concluded that the memorandum was obviously ambiguous, but
since it was not sufficient to indicate that plaintiffs would suffer "irrep-
arable injury," they should be left to their remedy at law."
Clear from analysis of the two decisions springing from the Libby
merger is that the courts will be highly receptive to any stated business
purpose in the face of an action by minority shareholders. The dissent
in Green, along with a great many other critics, attacked the use of
rule lOb-5 to control corporate fiduciary obligations. Judge Moore, dis-
senting in Green, pointed out that the majority "has extended to these
plaintiffs an independent, substantive right totally unrelated to the anti-
fraud scheme of the federal securities laws and in complete derogation
of a valid state rule regulating corporate activity."63 The condemnation
seems credible, especially in light of Cort v. Ash,6" a 1975 United States
Supreme Court opinion that "may portend the Supreme Court's in-
creased reluctance to entertain suits claiming a breach of state law fidu-
ciary obligations brought in the guise of a violation of federal law."65
One of the most valid criticisms of Green is leveled at the court's
utilization of rule lOb-5 to encroach upon an area traditionally left to
state legislatures-the regulation of fiduciary obligations of majority
shareholders.66 The drawing of the line between state and federal
58. Id. at 1312-13.
59. Id. at 1313.
60. See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
61. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1313 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. Id.
63. 533 F.2d at 1307 (footnote omitted).
64. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
65. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, Going Private 50 (1976) (unpublished manu-
script in University of North Carolina Law School Library).
66. 533 F.2d at 1304 (dissenting opinion).
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control is inherently fraught with pitfalls in this area because many cor-
porations, almost by definition, are forced to engage in securities trans-
actions.6 7  Thus, any regulation of securities transactions inevitably
leads to some regulation of internal corporate affairs, a province tradi-
tionally left to state control. As a result it becomes necessary to ascer-
tain the point at which these internal corporate transactions fall outside
rule lOb-5's true purpose. When does a given transaction cease being
primarily a securities transaction and therefore become a matter for
state regulation?
One possible means of dealing with the problem, in the limited
context of a short form merger, would begin with three assumptions:
(1) rule lOb-5's primary concern is to enforce the credibility of the se-
curities markets; (2) once the securities element of a transaction be-
comes only tangential, so that the primary concern of the minority
shareholders is actually centered on corporate mismanagement, then
deference should be given to state law; and (3) the corporate purpose
doctrine, to have any true validity in a securities context, must be a more
restrictive test, one of compelling corporate justification. 8 The imple-
mentation would be as follows: a series of transactions and objective
criteria 0 would be identified that have a high degree of correlation
67. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 65, at 50-51.
68. In order for the corporate purpose doctrine to continue as a viable force,
it must be restrictive enough to prevent avoidance by intelligent pleading by any group
of majority shareholders.
69. Possible criteria would include: (1) percentage decline in market price of the
stock since the corporation first went public; (2) substantial identity of the parties who
took the corporation public initially with those who later attempt to take it private;
and (3) the amount of time elapsed since -the corporation first went public. Marshel
v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), provides a flagrant example
of the first criterion. In 1968-69, in a public offering, 300,000 shares of Concord
Fabrics stock were sold at $15 per share and 200,000 at $20 per share. In 1974, when
the market price had reached a low of $1 per share, the majority shareholders decided
to go private at $3 per share. The court blocked the merger. At the other end of
the spectrum is Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976), in which the price
offered in the attempt to go private was $8.125 per share, a price not substantially below
what the public shareholders had paid. In fact, plaintiff in the case had purchased his
stock in 1973 at $6.00 per share. The problem comes in delineating the point at which
the market price has declined to such a degree that any forced buy-out of the public
minority would be inherently suspicious. Ascertainment of this point would necessarily
involve both empirical study and a survey of shareholder and management attitudes. The
second criterion would serve as a strong indicator of stock manipulation. If the same
people who originally took a corporation public are now attempting forcibly to take
it private, the obvious inference would be that their intention all along was to take
advantage of possible market fluctuations. Again, Marshel provides an excellent ex-
ample; there, exactly the same people who. had taken the corporation public initially
were attempting to take it private. Regarding the third criterion, the shorter the time
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with the aim of rule lOb-5 as indicated above. Once a transaction came
within one of the proscribed situations, or met a threshold number of
objective criteria, the application of rule 10b-5 would be triggered with
an attendant requirement of a showing of compelling corporate purpose
by the majority shareholders. An archetypal example is the situation in
which a group of shareholders who took the corporation public in a bull
market are attempting to go private in a depressed market. 70  Thus,
once plaintiffs show defendant's actions to fit one of the established cat-
egories, such as the one just described, the majority shareholders would
be forced to come forward with a compelling corporate purpose for the
merger. The objective of this type of structure would be two-fold.
First, the implementation of rule lOb-5 would be limited to only those
corporate activities inextricably intertwined with securities transactions,
thus keeping its application outside the domain of state law. There-
fore, the minority shareholders would be forced to resort to state rem-
edies unless their allegations of fraud were primarily centered on a
securities claim. Secondly, the use of the more restrictive compelling
corporate purpose standard would give that doctrine viability.
The corporate purpose doctrine, as enunciated in Green, repre-
sents an attempt to balance the protection of minority interests with the
need of the majority to effectuate necessary transactions in furtherance
of the corporation's business. But then, in Libby, the Second Circuit
gave strong indications that the doctrine is little more than. a shell,
which can be avoided through proper pleading by any defendant. A
much more pragmatic use of the doctrine would be to restrict its appli-
cation, in the context of rule lOb-5, to only those situations strongly cor-
related with securities transactions. 71 If there is to be a federal remedy
period between the corporation's initially going public and an attempted freeze-out of
the public minority, the stronger the inference that the majority shareholders are simply
playing the market at the possible expense of the public miriority. Again in Marshel,
the majority shareholders were attempting to go private only six years after the corpo-
ration had gone public.
70. This practice is one that has'caused a great deal of the fervor in the "going
private" area. It appears to be one of many possible activities that would create dis-
trust among the public in an already disfavored securities market.
71. See Borden, supra note 1.
If the federal securities laws are to be pushed so far beyond their original pur-
pose as not only to enforce recognized standards of fiduciary obligations but
to creatd new ones in a hotly debated area without deference to state law or
empirical study or any balancing of the numerous competing social interests
involved, one may suppose that one day there will again be a recognition of
the "mischievous result" of judicial law-making based upon an alleged "trans-
cendental body of law outside of any particular State" which federal courts
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for minority shareholders against a short form merger it should be for-
mulated by a legislative or an administrative body taking all the rele-
vant and unique considerations into account, 72 not by courts seeking
to apply rule 1Ob-5 to an area with which it was never intended to deal,
in a misguided effort to provide needed protection for minority share-
holders.
JOHNNY REID EDWARDS
Truth in Lending-Failure To Disclose a Right of Acceleration
Held Not a Violation
The Truth in Lending Act' and Federal Reserve Board Regula-
tion Z2 provide, inter alia, that a creditor shall disclose to its customers
any "default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of
late payments."'  Confronted with the issue whether a contractual
right to accelerate total indebtedness is such a charge when state law
requires a rebate of the unearned portion of the finance charge, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman
in their good judgment may discern and apply. We will then have in the
securities field our own Erie v. Tompkins.
Borden, supra note 1, at 1039 (footnotes omitted). This argument is relied upon
heavily by defendants in Green in their petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. V. Green,
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
72. It should be noted that the SEC has drafted proposed rules that would deal
specifically with the application of rule lOb-5 to the types of situations discussed herein.
If SEC rules are to be applied to these situations at all, it would certainly appear
that the better route would be through the Commission's proposed rules. Two of
these rules basically place disclosure requirements and substantive limitation on those
planning to carry out trdnsactions that would result in "going private." Proposed Rules
13e-3A & 13e-3B, Securities Act Release No. 5507 (Feb. 6, 1975), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RE. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,091-93.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamplet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The Truth in Lending Act is subchapter I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1691 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 &
Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1976). Regulation Z was promulgated by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to the authority granted by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1970). The Board's authority is designed to insure the effectiveness of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (9) (1970); 12 C.FR. § 226.8(b)(4) (1976).
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